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CoRPORATIONs--SHAREHOLDERs-EFFECT ON VoTING TRUST AGREEMENT
OF INABILITY TO TRANSFER SHARES TO THE VOTING TRUSTEES-Plaintiff filed
a petition in equity attacking his removal as a director and president of the
defendant corporation on the grounds that such removal was brought about
through the exercise of an alleged invalid voting trust agreement The plaintiff
and another shareholder, each owning fifty per cent of the stock in the defendant
corporation, had entered into a voting trust agreement by which they appointed
themselves and a third party as voting trustees. At the time the trust agreement
was executed, all of the stock was on deposit with an escrow agent subject to
an existing escrow contract. Plaintiff challenged the validity of the voting trust
agreement on the ground that the stock was not deposited with or transferred to
the voting trustees as required by section 18 of the General Corporation Law.1
The lower court sustained the petition on the basis that .the voting trust agreement was invalid. On appeal, held, affirmed. The provisions of the voting
trust statute are mandatory and non-compliance is not excused by impossibility.
Smith-v. Biggs Boiler Works Co., (Del. Ch. 1951) 82 A. (2d) 872.

1 Del. Rev. Code (1935) §2050: "One or more stockholders may by agreement in
writing deposit capital stock of an original issue with or transfer capital stock to any person
••• or corporation ••• authorized to act as trustee, for the purpose of vesting in said peISOn
••• who may be designated Voting Trustee ••• the right to vote thereon for any period of
time • • • not exceeding ten years. • ••"
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Although there is a general conllict as to the validity of voting trusts,2 the
Delaware court had not had occasion to rule upon the question prior to the
enactment of that state's fust voting trust statute in 1925.8 Therefore, the Delaware judiciary could interpret the statute unaided and unhampered by considerations of local common law.4 It has been consistently held that section 18
of the General Corporation Law occupies the entire field of voting trusts and
that compliance with the provisions of that section is mandatory.5 This doctrine
of statutory interpretation has been applied to defeat voting trusts which
attempted to avoid the transfer of shares for the purpose of saving the transfer
tax6 and which attempted to extend the duration of the trust beyond the statutory limit.7 The principal case appears to call for no special consideration except
for the fact that here compliance with the statutory provisions was impossible,
whereas in the previous cases non-compliance was due either to negligence or
intentional circumvention. The court determined, in the principal case, that
inability to transfer to the voting trustees did not excuse compliance with the
statute. Thus, the "impossibility'' situation was included as subject to the
mandatory provisions in a strictly logical extension of an already firmly established principle of interpretation. This position obliged the court to answer
the obvious argument that had the legislature desired to exclude stock in escrow
from being the subject of a voting trust, it would have so expressly provided.
The court countered with reference to a prior decision8 which held that the
voting trust statute did not purport to deal with or exclude other types of
agreements whereby shareholders might contract with each other as to how to
vote their shares. Since the owners of shares in pledge or escrow could effect the
2 The earlier cases held that the mere separation of voting power from beneficial ownership rendered the trust invalid because contrary to public policy. Shepaug Voting Trust
Cases, 60 Conn. 553, 24 A. 32 (1890). This view has been modified gradually to the
extent that usually voting trusts are no longer held unlawful per se. Their validity today
depends generally upon the legitimacy of the purpose for which they are formed. Boyer v.
Nesbitt, 227 Pa. 398, 76 A. 103 (1910). See collection of cases in 16 L.R.A. (n.s.) 1136
(1908), and 105 A.L.R. 123 (1936).
s 34 Del. Laws (1925) c. 112, §6.
4 While in Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, Inc., (8th Cir. 1928) 25 F. (2d) 783, a voting
trust formed prior to the enactment of the statute and consisting of stock in a Delaware
corporation was declared invalid, a federal decision does not bind a state court in determining its common law.
5 The question of statutory interpretation was presented in In re Chilson, 19 Del. Ch.
398, 168 A. 82 (1933), but a definite policy was not declared until Perry v. Missouri
Kan,sas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 191 A. 823 (1937). In the later case the court
quoted from In re Morse, 247 N.Y. 290 at 298, 160 N.E. 374 (1928), in which a similar
question was involved: "The test of validity is the rule of the statute. When the field was
entered by the Legislature it was fully occupied and no place was left for other voting
trusts.•••"
6 In re Chilson, 19 Del. Ch. 398, 168 A. 82 (1933).
7 Perry v. Missouri Kansas Pipe Line Co., 22 Del. Ch. 33, 191 A. 823 (1937); Appon
v. Belle Isle Corp., 29 Del. Ch. 122, 46 A. (2d) 749 (1946).
8 Ringling Brothers-Barnum and Bailey Combined Shows v. Ringling, 29 Del. Ch.
610, 53 A. (2d) 441 (1947).
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same result by another type of voting agreement, the argument that the legislature must have intended an exception to the absolute language of the voting
trust statute loses its force. The principal case reaffirms9 the necessity of strict
compliance with the provisions of the voting trust statute and serves notice on
draftsmen to make certain such compliance is possible.10
Peter Van Domelen

9 In Tracey v. Franklin, (Del. Ch. 1948) 61 A. (2d) 780, the validity of a voting
trust was attacked upon two grounds: (1) It was an unlawful restraint on alienation because
the voting trust certificates were made non-transferable, (2) a copy of the trust agreement
was not filed with the Delaware office of the corporation as required by statute. The court
chose to invalidate the trust on the basis of inalienability rather than on the seemingly easy
basis of statutory non-compliance. Was this a hint that the court may not have been
willing to follow the precedent of strict statutory compliance? On the other hand, the cases
appear to indicate a definite tendency on the part of the courts to avoid the de jure-de
facto distinction present in other phases of corporation law.
10 For the interesting problem as to whether the parties in the principal case could
have achieved the desired result by any other type of voting agreement, see 46 MrcH. L
REv. 70 (1947).

